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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XVII

JUNE,

1932

NUMBER 4

THE FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS OF
MVR. JUSTICE CARDOZO
A Prophecy Based upon a Fragmentary Review of the Opinions of
Judge Cardozo
CHARLES P. LiGHT, Jr.*
Judge Cardozo of the Court of Appeals of New York, at long last,
is Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Eminently fitting it is that the ceremony which effected this happy
transition was marked by brevity and simplicity. Its simplicity but
serves to accentuate the auspiciousness of the occasion. Its brevity
makes it possible and right to reproduce the proceedings.'
Chief Justice Hughes, the entire membership of the Court being
present, said:
"The Court is advised that Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, for
many years Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of
New York, has been appointed an Associate Justice of this Court
to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Mr. Justice
Holmes. Judge Cardozo is present. The Clerk will read his
Commission. Judge Cardozo will then take the oath of office,
and the Marshal will escort him to the Bench."
The Clerk then read the Commission:
"Herbert Hoover, President of the United States of America,
"To all who shall see these presents greeting:
"Know ye; that reposing specialtrustandconfidenceinthewisdom,
uprightness and learning of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, of New
York, I have nominated, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, do appoint him an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and do authorize and empower him to execute and fulfill the duties of that office according to the Constitution and laws of the said United States, and
to have and to hold the said office, with all the powers, privileges
and emoluments to the same of right appertaining unto him, the
said Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, during his good behavior.
"In testimony whereof, I have caused these Letters to be made
patent and the seal of the Department of Justice to be hereunto
affixed.
*Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
'The United States Daily, March 15, 1932, p. 4.
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"Done at the City of Washington this second day of March, in
the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and thirty-two
and of the Independence of the United States of America the one
hundred and fifty-sixth.
(Signed) Herbert Hoover.
"By the President: William D. Mitchell, Attorney General."
The oath of office was then administered by the clerk, and Mr.
Justice Cardozo was escorted by the marshal to his seat on the bench.
Frequently justices are appointed to the Supreme Court without
having had previous judicial experience. Six members of the present
Court are of this group.2 Of these appointees it might have been
difficult to prognosticate at the threshold of their judicial careers.3
There is also the case which, so far as is known, has occurred only
once, of the appointee having served before upon the same Supreme
Bench. Chief Justice Hughes makes up this class. 4 In his case
prophecy should have been relatively facile. That it was misguided
is a fecund commentary upon the temper of the times. Not to engage
in belabored grouping, there is a third class whose members have
served before in state or federal courts. From this group comes Mr.
Justice Cardozo. 5 It is not only possible but meet that his opinions,
written while judge and later chief judge of the New York Court of
Appeals, be examined for the light they will cast upon his future
course. His common law opinions we will put to one side, inasmuch
as the Court to which he now belongs "is too aloof from adequate
contact with the stuff of common law cases to make it an apt tribunal
for such causes."8 This is reluctant renunciation, for his own contributions and those of the New York Court under his "able guidance
...have done much to clarify many of the most obscure and difficult
parts of the subject ' 7 of Torts, to mention but one branch of the law.
Much has been written of the function of the Supreme Court of the
2

justices McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, Stone.and Roberts.
'Bach of the six jjistices, save perhaps Mr. Justice Butler, seems to have had
previous governmental experience. See the respective biographies in WHO's WHO
IN A mERICA (1929-1930).

4

Chief justice Jay declined a second appointment as chief justice, and Mr.
Justice Rutledge's second appointment, to be chief justice, failed of confirmation
by the Senate. Mr. Justice White was appointed chief justice, having served
continuously on the Court. 3 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY, Appendix pp. 479-483.
5
1Mtr. Justice Van Devanter served for a short time as Chief Justice of the
Wyoming Supreme Court and later as United States Circuit Judge. WHo's WHo
IN AMERICA (1929-1930).

Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1929 (1930) 44 HARv.L. REV. I, I8.
7
BoHLEN, CASES ON TORTS (3rd Ed. 1930) Preface p. iii.

MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO
United States in deciding upon the constitutionality of state laws
which touch men in myriad ways. Few there are today who are
unaware of the crucial part played by the Court in our governmental
scheme. Some may decry the Court's power of review, others may
applaud, none deny that the power is being exercised. More widespread today is the knowledge that the issue of constitutionality in
"important" cases is not clearly defined as white or black. More
often than not it is gray. Theoretically, if the gray is not too dark, it
will pass muster as white, the law will be upheld. It would be too
much to expect of the judicial perception of color, unanimity upon
the precise shade of the gray. To one judge a gray, not too dark in
degree to be treated as white, may to another appear to be Stygian
black. It is fashionable today to call the former and more optimistic
judge a liberal, to give to the latter, a pessimist, the name conservative. Whatever the label we apply, the judge must choose his color
for the law. Only rarely are we made conscious of the difficulty of
choice so candidly lamented by Mr. Justice McKenna: "I find myself
unable to concur, yet reluctant to dissent."8 His inability resulted
in a much criticised five-to-four decision. It is in this kind of case
where the choice is narrowly made, the die barely cast, that spectators
are not averse to crying, "Colorblind!" or worse. There might well
be more of tolerant reluctance to predicate judicial colorblindness of
an inability to distinguish between the infinite shades of gray. It is
important nevertheless to learn as much as possible of the powers of
perception, of the attributes and of the abilities possessed by the
interpreters of our laws. Vastly more important it becomes if the
judge is to sit upon the Supreme Court of the United States. For
this Court, "governmental operations and the application of constitutional provisions are destined more and more to furnish the staple
business." 9 Its role in our national drama "is that of high judicial
statesmanship in the adjustment of controversies of a public nature
to which our complicated federal society gives rise."' 0

I
We proceed, first, to consider the opinions of Judge Cardozo which
set forth his technique of constitutional and statutory interpretation.
The opinions have as a common denominator the striving of the
judge to discover the essence of the meaning of the provision in the
sArizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 434, 39 Sup. Ct. 553,
(1919).
g0p. Cit. supra note 6, 44 HARV. L.

RIv. I, 15, 18.

10

boid., p. 18.
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case before him. His function is to determine the intent of the
framers of the constitution" or of the legislature which enacted the
statute. In Judge Cardozo's own words:
"Our duty is to search out the intention of the Legislature
and to give effect to it when discovered though the expression be
imperfect..

"12

The acid test of the ability to judge is faced when the expression
of the legislative intent is particularly imperfect. The test is passed
when the judge can skillfully read the legislative mind, when he is
able to appreciate the often Delphic utterances of that phenomenal
organism. Fortunate it would seem to be too that the opportunity
for sane interstitial legislation increases in proportion to the oracular
quality of the constitutional or statutory provision.
The problem of determining the intent of the legislature in enacting
a statute which provided that no child under the age of fourteen
years should be employed or permitted to work in or in connection
with any mercantile establishment, gives Judge Cardozo no apparent
trouble:
"The employer, therefore, is chargeable with the sufferance
of illegal conditions by the delegates of his power. But to say
that does not tell us how sufferance may be implied. We do not
construe the statute with all the rigor urged by counsel for the
People. Not every casual service rendered by a child at the
instance of a servant is 'suffered' by the master. If a traveling
salesman employed by a mercantile establishment in New York
gives a dime to a boy of thirteen who has carried his sample case
in Buffalo, the absent employer is not brought within the grip of
the statute. Sufferance as here prohibited implies knowledge or
the opportunity through reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge.

...

But where work is done away from the plant, the

inference of sufferance weakens as the opportunity for supervision lessens. No one would say that an employer had suffered
the continuance of a wrong because some pieceworker, working
at home on a garment, had been aided by a child. In such a case,
the true implications of sufferance would be almost instinctively
perceived. On the other hand, we think the statute draws no
distinction between sufferance and permission. This is apparent
from its scheme as revealed in related sections (Labor Law,
sees. 7o, x61, 93, 13i). The two words are used indiscriminately.
In such circumstances, each may take some little color from the
other. Permission, like sufferance connotes something less than
consent. Sufferance, like permission, connotes some opportunity
nAn incisive commentary is found in BEARD AND BEARD, THE AMERIcAN
LEvuTHAN(1930), C. II.
2i0 3 Park Ave. Co. v. Exchange Buffet Corp., 242 N. Y. 366,374, 152 N. E. 117
ii9 (1926).
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for knowledge. Thus viewed, the scheme of the statute becomes
consistent and uniform."' 3
We have in this passage an application of what may be styled the rule
of rationality or of reason, more fully, the rule of rational selflimitation or of reasonable forbearance in statutory construction.
The same rule Judge Cardozo follows where a legislative interpretation of a constitutional provision is questioned. Then, to his way of
thinking, the allowance of latitude to the legislature becomes the rule
of reason for the court. If reasonable latitude is denied, if a majority
of the judges confuse the expediency of legislation with the power to
legislate, he will dissent. He did so when a majority held that the
New York statute providing for a forty-five million dollar bond issue
with which to pay a bonus to the state's citizens who served the
country during the late war, violated the constitutional provision
reading: "The credit of the state shall not in any manner be given or
loaned to or in aid of any individual... "
"I am led, therefore, to the conclusion that the payment of
this bonus, as money earned, but not received, is not wholly
without support in something which the legislature might estimate as a moral or honorary obligation. If there is any reasonable basis for such an estimate, for such a conception of equity
and justice, the courts must yield to the judgment of the legislature that it is worthy of recognition. The question is then one
that the legislaturemust determine for itself.... 'Its decision...
can rarely, if ever, be the subject of review by the judicial branch of
the government'... Some may think the service so far beyond
requital that the attempt should be surrendered for mere futility. Others may think that high and unselfish sacrifice is
cheapened when repaid in money. Others again may think that
for the sake of the economic or financial stability of the commonwealth, losses already suffered should be left to lie where they
have fallen. These are questions of political or legislative
expediency. I make no attempt to answer them. I am not to
substitute my judgment for the judgment of the lawmakers.
...If there be the possibility of conflicting motives, those that
vitiate are to be rejected, and those that validate presumed."' 14
Where the legislature has spoken clearly, there is no room for a
strained interpretation of the words of a statute even to achieve
humane results. Where the interstices are filled Judge Cardozo may
regret, but he will not act. Specifically, a statute of the state provided
that alien friends are empowered to take, hold, transmit and dispose
13
People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms Co., 225 N.Y. 25, 30, 31, 121 N. E. 474,
476 (1918).
14People v. Westchester Co. Nat. Bank, 231 N. Y. 465, 489, 490, 132 N. E. 241,

250 (1921).
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of real property within the state in the same manner as native born
citizens. An American citizen died leaving real estate in New York.
Is his daughter, who has married a subject of Austria-Hungary, eligible to take the real estate, where the father died twenty days after
war was declared between the United States and Austria? In
answer to many arguments, Judge Cardozo writes:
"The legislature might have refused to draw a distinction
between enemies and friends. It might have given capacity to
all aliens alike, and in that event capacity would not have ended
with the outbreak of the war. It chose a policy less liberal. It
gave the privilege to friends and withheld the privilege from
enemies. I find no ground for the belief that it intended the definition of enemies to wait upon the varying terms of proclamations of future presidents, to be enlarged to-day, and restricted
to-morrow, with the changing fortunes of a war. For the same
reason, I cannot think that there was willingness to impair the
security of titles by substituting the uncertain and fluid test of
loyalty in act and speech for the certain and historic test of
allegiance to the sovereign. In the law of land, more than in any
other branch of law, words are used as terms of art. Here, more
than in any other field, the method of history supplies the
organon of interpretation for the work of legislators and judges.
Deep into the soil go the roots of the words in which the rights of
the owners of the soil find expression in the law. We do not
readily uproot the growths of centuries."'15
Nor has the rule of reasonable latitude room for play where the
terms of a constitutional provision are clear, and where the legislative
act in question by its tendencies runs squarely into a clear constitutional prohibition:
"The plaintiffs made a contract with the defendant, the city of
New York, in August, 1916, for the construction of that part of
the subway known as route number 61 in consideration of the
payment of $4,194,797. They assert the existence of a later
contract by which the defendant, acting through the public
service commission and the board of estimate and apportionment, undertook to pay to them the extra cost incurred through
the advance in the price of labor and material as a consequence of
the war. The validity of that contract is the chief question to be
determined. The circumstances leading up to its making are set
forth fully in the fourth cause of action, to which for the time
being our attention will be confined....
"We think the contract is condemned by article III, section 28,
of the Constitution of the state.
"'The legislature shall not, nor shall the common council
of any city, nor any board of supervisors, grant any extra compensation to any public officer, servant, agent or contractor'...
15

Techt v. Hughes,

229

N. Y.

222, 239, 240, 128

N. B. 185, 190

(1920).
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"We hold, then, that the defendant's promise is unenforcible
for lack of a consideration to support it. If, however, some shred
of value could be discovered, if we could gather from the maze
of this complaint the abandonment of an opportunity to find
cheaper labor elsewhere, the promise in its dominant purpose and
effect would remain the promise of a gift. We are dealing here
with a restraint imposed by the Constitution itself upon the
agencies of government. Its prohibitions are to be interpreted,
not narrowly and grudgingly like those of a penal statute
but broadly and liberally to promote the policy behind them.
..What concerns us here is not whether a contract exists, but
whether in substance and operation it is one for extra compensation, a largess in purpose and effect though in name and in
form a payment for money's worth... The Constitution would
be 'a splendid bauble' ... if its mandate could be evaded by the
surrender of any right however trivial or technical. In such
and consequences count for more than forms
matters, tendencies
16
and names."'
We are furnished another illustration that the rule of reasonable
forbearance will not be applied where it is clearly evident that the
legislature is attempting to evade a Home Rule provision of the state
constitution to this effect: "The Legislature shall not pass any law
relating to the property, affairs or government of cities, which shall
be special or local either in its terms or in its effect... ", except by an
extraordinary form of legislation. judge Cardozo says:
"Futile is the endeavor to mark the principle of division with
the precision or binding force of a codifying statute. Any statement attempted will need to be shaded down or enlarged to meet
the exigencies of particular instances as hereafter they develop.
Roughly speaking, however, the principle of division, considered
merely for thepurpose of a working approximation, maybestated
to be this: If the class in its formation is so unnatural and wayward that only by the rarest coincidence can the range of its
extension include more than one locality, and at best but two or
three, the act so hedged and circumscribed is local in effect. If
the same limits are apparent upon the face of the act, unaided by
extrinsic evidence, or are so notorious or obvious as to be the
subject of judicial notice, it is also local in its terms.
"The statute now before us does not survive these tests. All
the stigmata of arbitrary selection, of forced and unnatural
classification, appear upon its face. By its terms a new burden
has been laid, not upon cities generally, despite its pretense of
generality, but upon one city or a few. A misshapen congeries
of accidents 7has been made to masquerade under the semblance

of a class.'

16McGove

v. City of New York, 234 N. Y. 377, 38i, 382, 384, 390, 138 N. E.

26, 28, 29, 32 (1923).
17Matter of Mayor etc. of New York (Elm St.), 246
24, 26 (1927).

N. Y. 72, 78, 79, 158 N. E.
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It is to be noted that Judge Cardozo interprets the Home Rule
prohibition "broadly and liberally to promote the policy behind" it.
This yet leaves to the judges the determination of what that policy
is. Where unfortunate results would be reached by a particular
finding on policy, he will search for another meaning. This yet may
be called a broad construction, but it is made to fulfil a narrow policy.
In reality the prohibition is being narrowly construed. Judge Cardozo gives a narrow construction to the constitutional provision set
out in the last paragraph, when he holds that a state law regulating
multiple dwellings in the city of New York alone is not within its
prohibitions:
"The Multiple Dwelling Act is aimed at many evils, but most
of all it is a measure to eradicate the slum. - It seeks to bring
about conditions whereby healthy children shall be born, and
healthy men and women reared, in the dwellings of the great
metropolis. To have such men and women is not a city concern
merely. It is the concern of the whole State. Here is to be bred
the citizenry with which the State must do its work in the years
that are to come. The end to be achieved is more than the
avoidance of pestilence or contagion. The end to be achieved
is the quality of men and women. .. . If the moral and physical
fibre of its manhood and its womanhood is not a State concern,
the question is, what is? .
True it is that"There may be difficulty at times in allocating interests to
State or municipality, and in marking their respective limits
when they seem to come together."' 9
However, in this zone where "State and city concerns overlap and
intermingle""The Constitution and the statute will not be read as enjoining an impossible dichotomy. The question to be faced is this,
has the State surrendered the power to enact local laws by the
usual forms of legislation where subjects of State concern are
directly and substantially involved, though intermingled with
and perhaps identical with them, are concerns proper to the
these, 20

city?"

Judge Cardozo finds that the judicial precedents point to the answer,
no. To fix the scope of permissible state action in the intermingled
field, he applies a rational test of substantiality:
"How great must be the infusion of local interest before
fetters are imposed? There is concession even by the plaintiff
N. Y. 467, 484, 167 N. E. 705, 711 (1929). Concurring
19Supra note 18 at 485, 167 N. E. at 711.
0Supra note i8 at 489, 490, 167 N. E. at 713.

18Adler v. Deegan,
opinion.
2
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that if the subject be 'predominantly' of State concern, the
Legislature may act according to the usual forms. But predominance is not the test. The introduction of such a test involves
comparisons too vague and too variable, too much a matter of
mere opinion, to serve as an objective standard. To adopt it is to
infect our legislation with the virus of uncertainty. ... Considerations of 'more or less' will lead us in such a case, and in many
others, into a morass of indecision. The test is rather this, that
if the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of State concern, the Legislature may act, though intermingled with it are
concerns of the locality. Measured by that test, this statute
must prevail ...."21
There is always the possibility of conflicting state and municipal
regulations of the same intermingled subject-matter. To take care
of. this possibility, Judge Cardozo employs a treatment similar to
that used by the Supreme Court in certain cases arising under the
Commerce Clause:
"I assume that if the affair is partly State and partly local,
the city is free to act until the Statehas intervened. As to concerns
of this class there is thus concurrent jurisdiction for each in default of action by the other. The power of the city is subordinate at such times to the power of the State, but may be exerted
without restraint22to the extent that the two can work in harmony together."
II
The historic guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures
and against compulsory self-incrimination are today much in the
public eye. Judge Cardozo's opinions in cases which involve these
guarantees convincingly demonstrate his talent as constitutional
interpreter. Especially important are they as prophecy, since he
will now be called upon to apply the provisions of the Federal Bill of
Rights:
The Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.. ."
(Alone among the states, the New York counterpart of the
Fourth Amendment is found in a statute, the Civil Rights Law.23)
The Fifth Amendment: "No person ...shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself..."
(The New York Constitution contains a similar guarantee.)
We remember that the legislature by giving statutory immunity
from punishment, which might follow upon incriminating disclosures,
21

Supra note 18 at 490, 491, 167 N. E. at 713.
22Supra note 18 at 491, 167 N. E. at 714.
2Fraenkel, ConcerningSearches and Seizures (1921) 34 HARV. L. REv. 361.
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may require a witness to speak. Where such immunity has been
given, is the statute that grants it to be construed to prevent disbarment of an attorney whose testimony shows that he has acted uinprofessionally? Are the courts to extend the protection of the provision against self-incrimination to this length? Judge Cardozo
takes this common-sense view:
"Consequences cannot alter statutes, but may help to fix
their meaning. Statutes must be so construed, if possible,
that absurdity and mischief may be avoided. The claim of immunity from disbarment cannot survive the application of that
test. If the exemptionprotects lawyers, it must equally protect
physicians, whose licenses have long been subject to revocation
for misconduct... Two great and honorable professions have
in that view been denied the right to purify their membership
and vindicate their honor. The charlatan and rogue may assume
to heal the sick. The knave and criminal may pose as minister
of justice. Such things cannot have been intended, and will not
be allowed.
"The order of disbarment should be afflrmed."2'
Judge Cardozo, we have seen, will interpret a constitutional or
important statutory prohibition liberally to promote the policy behind it. In determining what that policy is, with respect to the
search of a person lawfully arrested for crime, he looks with the clear
eye of the realist:
"The basic principle is this: Search of the person is unlawful
when the seizure of the body is a trespass, and the purpose of the
search is to discover grounds as yet unknown for arrest or accusation... Search of the person becomes lawful when grounds for
arrest and accusation have been discovered, and the law is in the
act of subjecting the body of the accused to its physical dominion.
"The distinction may seem subtle, but in truth it is founded in
shrewd appreciation of the necessities of government. We are
not to strain an immunity to the point at which human nature
rebels against honoring it in conduct. The peace officer empowered to arrest must be empowered to disarm. If he may disarm, he may search, lest a weapon be concealed. The search
being lawful, he retains what he finds if connected with the crime.
We may be sure that the law would be flouted and derided if, defeating its own ends, it drew too fine a point, after sanctioning
the search,2between the things to be retained and the things to be
returned."
In the same way that he refuses to strain the constitutional immunity to overprotect an accused, Judge Cardozo will decline to
2Matter of Rouss, 221 N. Y. 8I, 9i, II6 N.E . 782, 785, 786 (1917).
uPeople v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 197, 142 N. E.583, 584 (1923).
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fritter the immunity away because public sentiment is aroused
against supposed wrongdoers:
"The privilege may not be violated because in a particular
case its restraints are inconvenient or because the supposed
malefactor may be a subject of public execration or because the
disclosure of his wrongdoings will promote the public weal.
"It is a barrier interposed between the individual and the
power of the government, a barrier interposed by the sovereign
people of the state; and neither legislators nor judges are free
to overleap it.
"The appellant is therefore privileged to refuse to answer
questions that may tend to implicate him in a crime, unless by
some act of amnesty or indemnity, or some valid resolution
equivalent thereto, he has been relieved from the risk of prosecution for any felony or misdemeanor that his testimony may reveal. The immunity is not adequate if it does no more than
assure him that the testimony coming from his lipswill not beread
in evidence against him upon a criminal prosecution. The clues
thereby developed may still supply the links whereby a chain of
guilt can be forged from the testimony of others. To force disclosure from unwilling lips, the immunity must be so broad that
,,21
the risk of prosecution is ended altogether.
His peroration is masterly:
"We are not unmindful of the public interests, of the insistent
hope and need that the ways of bribers and corruptionists shall
be exposed to an indignant world. Commanding as those interests are, they do not supply us with a license to palter with
the truth or to twist what has been written in the statutes into
something else that we should like to see. Historic liberties and
privileges are not to bend from day to day 'because of some
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to
the feelings and distorts the judgment' .. . , are not to change
their form and content in response to the 'hydraulic pressure'
...
exerted by great causes. A community whose judges would
be willing to give it whatever law might gratify the impulse of
the moment would find in the end that it had paid too high a
price for relieving itself of the bother of awaiting a session of the
Legislature and the27enactment of a statute in accordance with
established forms."
Judge Cardozo is of the opinion that the rule which forbids the use
in evidence of objects secured through an unlawful search oversecures the criminal at the expense of society. He would keep distinct
the immunities of the New York counterparts of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. This conclusion he reaches after a frank balancing of the competing interests:
26

Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N. Y. 244, 177 N. E. 489, 491 (193i).
Supra note 26 at 268, 177 N. E. at 497

27
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"No doubt the protection of the statute would be greater
from the point of view of the individual whose privacy had been
invaded if the government were required to ignore what it had
learned through the invasion. The question is whether protection for the individual would not be gained at a disproportionate
loss of protection for society. On the one side is the social need
that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that
law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office. There are dangers
in any choice. The rule of the Adams case strikes a balance between opposing interests. We must hold it to be the law until
those organs of government by which a change of public policy
is normally effected,
shall give notice to the courts that the change
28
has come to pass.1
The Federal rule prohibiting the use in evidence of unlawfully seized
objects, we know, is subject to exceptions. Here is trenchant comment upon its operation:
"The Federal rule as it stands is either too strict or too lax.
A Federal prosecutor may take no benefit from evidence collected
through the trespass of a Federal officer. The thought is that in
appropriating the results, he ratifies the means... He does not
have to be so scrupulous about evidence brought to him by others.
How finely the line is drawn is seen when we recall that marshals
in the service of the nation are on one side of it, and police in the
service of the States on the other. The nation may keep what
the servants of the States supply ... We must go farther or not
so far. The professed object of the trespass rather than the official character of the trespasser should test the rights of government...- 2 9
We shall scan the United States Reports with interest to see whether
comment is translated into action.
III
Enough cases involving the doctrine of the separation of the powers
of government reach the Supreme Court to make the position of a new
justice a matter of moment. This doctrine can be applied in such
fashion as to strike down wise legislation. We find that Judge Cardozo takes a via media. His choice leads to a refusal to give advisory
opinions in the absence of a statute so directing:
"The record now before us supplies a pointed illustration
of the need that the judicial function be kept within its ancient
bounds. Some of the arguments addressed to us in criticism of
the resolution apply to all awards for death benefits; others to
awards made before June, 1916; others to awards where one of
the dependents is a widow. It is thus conceivable that the pro28
Peoplev. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13,24,25, 15o N. E. 585, 589 (1926).
29

Supra note 28 at 22, 15o N. E. at 588.
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posed resolution may be valid as to some carriers and invalid as
to others. We are asked by an omnibus answer to an omnibus
question to adjudge the rights of all. That is not the way in
which a system of case law develops. We deal with the particular instance; and we wait till it arises." 3
In denying that a judge may act non-judicially as an adjunct of the
executive power of the state, Judge Cardozo points to the sound
reasons behind the separation doctrine. Its proper application calls
for judicial statesmanship of high order, for a nice appreciation of
governmental realities. We see that here:
"From the beginnings of our history, the principle has been
enforced that there is no inherent power in Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfilment of judicial
duties... The exigencies of government have made it necessary
to relax a merely doctrinaire adherence to a principle so flexible
and practical, so largely a matter of sensible approximation, as
that of the separation of powers. Elasticity has not meant that
what is of the essence of the judicial function may be destroyed
by turning the power to decide into a pallid opportunity to consult and recommend...
"The policy at the root of the constitutional prohibition
reinforces this conclusion. The policy is to conserve the time
of the judges for the performance of their work as judges, and to
save them from the entanglements, at times the partisan suspicions, so often the result of other and conflicting duties. Some of
these possibilities find significant illustration in the very cases
before us now. . . .,,I
Again, in the field of questions political, Judge Cardozo wisely
thinks that the courts should tread carefully until the legislature or
the executive has first acted:
"No one can study the vague and wavering statements of
treatise and decision in this field of international law with any
feeling of assurance at the end that he has chosen the right
path. One looks in vain either for uniformity of doctrine or
for scientific accuracy of exposition. There are wise cautions
for the statesman. There are few precepts for the judge. All
the more, in this uncertainty, I am impelled to the belief that
until the political departments have acted, the courts, in refusing to give effect to treaties, should limit their refusal to the
needs of the occasion; that they are not bound by any rigid formula to nullify the whole or nothing; and that in determining
whether this treaty survived the coming of war, they are free
to make choice of the conclusion which shall seem the most in
30
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keeping with the traditions of the law, the policy of the 3statutes,
'2
the dictates of fair dealing, and the honor of the nation.
IV
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from denying to a
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The
amendment prevents arbitrary discriminations against or arbitrary
classifications of persons or things for particular treatment. Obviously it will require judicial skill of large calibre to strike a balance
between reasonableness and unreasonableness in classification.
Should the legislature of the State provide that United States citizens
only are to be employed on public works, would a contractor using
alien labor be able successfully to attack the classification contained
in the statute? Judge Cardozo illumines while he is deciding:
"It [the government] is not fettered, of course, by any rule
of absolute equality; the public welfare may at times be bound
up with the welfare of a class; but public welfare, in a large
sense, must, none the less, be the end in view. ...
To disqualify citizens from employment on the public works is not
only discrimination, but arbitrary discrimination. To disqualify aliens is discrimination indeed, but not arbitrary discrimination, for the principle of exclusion is the restriction
of the resources of the state to the advancement and profit of
the members of the state. Ungenerous and unwise such discrimination may be. It is not for that reason unlawful.
"... There are probably many other public works so intimately related, if not to life, at least to health and comfort, that
merely arbitrary or oppressive discrimination against the alien
in regulating their use, would be a denial by the state of the
equal protection of the laws. To attempt to draw the line in
advance is futile. The question must in each case be whether
the use is one that is reasonably incidental to life under modem
conditions in a civilized state, or whether it is rather a privilege
which the state may grant or may withhold. To be employed by
the state on the public works, and to receive payment out of the
public purse is, I think, a privilege rather than a right. ... "I
The courts are not to make use of the Fourteenth Amendment to
strike down highly desirable social legislation. The legislature,
Judge Cardozo feels, must be given a pretty free hand in its classification of persons and localities. Not only his results in this type of
case, but even the language used in expressing them reminds us
happily of his predecessor, Mr. Justice Holmes.
32
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"This section was amended in 1924 by adding thereto the
following:
"'Whenever ninety per centum of the herds of cattle in any
town have been subjected to the tuberculin test... and the
owner of any untested herd in such town refuses or neglects to
have his herd tuberculin tested, then the commissioner may order
the premises or farm on which such untested herd is harbored to
be put in quarantine, so that no domestic animal shall be removed
from or brought to the premises quarantined, and so that no
products of the domestic animals on the premises so quarantined
shall be removed from the said premises.'"...
"We find no arbitrary preference of localities or persons, no
classification unrelated to the mischief to be remedied.
"The plan of the statute is to make the township the territorial unit in the war upon unhealthy cattle. More will be accomplished, it has been thought, by attacking the units severally
than by going against all together... No doubt there are gaps
and leaks in any scheme of subdivision. ...
At least the local
herds will be sound, and buyers from that source of supply will
have a certificate of safety. A class may lawfully be restricted
if the lines defining the restriction are not arbitrary altogether
and the rule to be applied within them is uniform and even. ...
Legislation is not void because it hits the evil that is uppermost.
Equally it is not void because it hits the evil that is nearest.
There would be paralysis in a different rule. ....
"The size of the unit is not, however, the sole basis of the
attack upon the statute. Attack is also made upon the standard of selection to be applied within the unit. ...
There is
a denial, in this view, of the equal protection of the laws if not
an unlawful delegation of legislative power, when the voluntary use of a test by a prescribed percentage of the owners in a
township is made a standard of conduct to which others must
conform, though owners in other townships, where there is a
different percentage of opposition, are free from such restraints.
"A command thus conditioned is neither a denial of equal
laws... , nor an illegitimate delegation of legislative power...
It is the adaptation of the rule, according to the judgment of
the vicinage, to the occasion and the need. Small use would
there be.in stimulating the many within a township to a care of
the public health, if one or a few wiseacres or obstructionists
could make the labor vain. More and more, in its social engineering, the law is looking to co-operative effort by those within an industry as a force for social good. It is harnessing the
power that is latent within groups as it is harnessing the power
in wind and fall and stream. Conspicuously is it doing this in its
dealings with agricultural producers, spread often over wide
areas, and thus deficient in cohesion, but yielding up new energies when functioning together. We see this in the very statutes,
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already quoted, with their attempt to check tuberculosis by cooperative effort ....
"m
A civil service law decision, containing a treatment similar to that
in an equal protection case, brings vividly before our eyes a plodding
pedestrian police officer, who, Judge Cardozo rightly tells us, cannot
be put in a class by himself merely because he has plodded a good
long time.
"Here, upon the face of the statute, the signs are unmistakable
that a favor is to be conferred upon a single member of the force
by making length of service count for him when it is to count for
no one else. . .. The act would have been more sincere, and not
different in effect, if it had designated its beneficiary by name,
and not by the roundabout method of a description of his record.
"... There is no denial of the power of the Legislature to
make experience a factor in determining promotion. What is
denied is the power to establish such a test for one applicant
without establishing it for others in the same or like conditions.
Some qualities, such as those of bravery or heroism, are unique
and incommensurable...
They refuse, like originality or
genius, to stay within a class. Exceptions appropriate at such
times must not be stretched to take within their shelter the merit,
more pedestrian, of mere adherence to the job. These plodding
virtues are not so rare that their possessors, however estimable,
cannot be classified in groups. The mandate of the Constitution
is that merit and fitness shall be ascertained 'so far as practicable'
by competitive examination ...
Discretion there is in determining the limits of the practicable. It is not, however, an uncontrolled discretion, but one subject to the teachings of experience and the supervision of the courts... The range of selection
must be determined by a principle of general application unless
the qualities to be preferred are so unique and extraordinary as to
bid defiance to classification and call for treatment by themselves.
Such plainly
are not the qualities that are here selected for re35
ward."
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four which was
designed to secure to the citizen equality of treatment when he was
away from home, has been construed to permit numerous discriminations against him. And none the less, because his residence was the
basis of the statutory discrimination rather than his citizenship.
Necessity or expediency no doubt require such discriminations at
times. Where, however, the state taxes the estate of a nonresident
decedent under a scheme which results in a tax many times heavier
34
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than that imposed upon the estate of a resident, Judge Cardozo is
quick to apply the prohibition of Article Four:
"The State does not establish the validity of this act by
showing that from certain points of view or in aid of certain
purposes a classification discriminating between residents or
non-residents has a basis, not wholly illusory, in policy or reason.
There is no occasion to inquire whether such a showing would
suffice if we were dealing with the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and nothing else. We deal in fact with
something more. 'The power of a State to make reasonable
and natural classifications for purposes of taxation is clear and
not questioned; but neither under form of classification nor otherwise can any State enforce taxing laws which in their practical
operation materially abridge or impair the equality of commercial privileges secured by the Federal Constitution to citizens of
the several States'... Classification may be supported by many
considerations of expediency or fairness and, none the less, may
be illegal if it denies to the citizens of any State the privileges and
immunities that belong to citizens of another. To put it differently, equality in such circumstances is itself the highest policy,
to which other policies must bow. The Constitution so commands. Few of its commands, if any, have had an influence
more profound upon the attainment and preservation of the unity
of the nation...
"The principle of equal treatment for the citizens of all the
States is a good deal moreprecious than the gain of revenue in one
year or another. We are not to whittle it down by refinement of
exception or by the implication of a reciprocal advantage that is
merely trivial or specious. The principle is put in jeopardythere is set in it an entering wedge that may be the beginning of
its destruction-if this statute is upheld." 6
V
Equally as difficult of solution as the problems of classification,
because of a like necessity of fine balancing of competitive interests,
are cases in which it is contended that an exercise of police power
offends the Due Process Clause. To the courts is entrusted the
difficult task of fixing the limits beyond which the power of the state
must not be employed in touching persons and property. judge
Cardozo, like Mr. Justice Holmes, would give latitude to the legislature in fixing these limits in the first instance. He has not interpreted the prohibition of that clause to mean a denial of wide discretion in enacting measures for the health, safety, morals and welfare
of the inhabitants of the state. Whether questioned legislation is
36
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invalid for lack.of "due process"37 frequently depends upon the degree
of severity manifested by the legislature and, we are reminded, "in
such matters, differences of degree are vital." 38 Where the police
power is used to ensure the trustworthiness of brokers of real estate,
by requiring that they secure licences before beginning to sell, Judge
Cardozo finds no constitutional barrier in the way:
"The sole question in this court is whether the requirement
of a license is a constitutional exercise of legislative power.
"The Legislature has a wide discretion in determining
whether a business or occupation shall be barred to the dishonest or incompetent...
Callings, it is said, there are so
inveterate and basic, so elementary and innocent, that they
must be left open to all alike, whether virtuous or vicious. If
this be assumed, that of broker is not one of them. The intrinsic
nature of the business combines with practice and tradition to
attest the need of regulation. The real estate broker is brought
by his calling into a relation of trust and confidence. Constant
are the opportunities by concealment and collusion to extract
illicit gains. We know from our judicial records that the opportunities have not been lost. With temptation so aggressive, the
dishonest or untrustworthy may not reasonably complain if they
9
are told to stand aside. . . .
Nor is he able to find any due process objection to an ordinance of a
municipal Board of Health which prohibits the sale of patent medicine
unless the names of the ingredients, having therapeutic effect, are
registered, if the ordinance's operation is confined to drugs acquired
after its passage:
"A danger exists, and the only question is whether the means
of correction are appropriate. We cannot say that the means
have no relation to the end. The public health is safe-guarded
by disclosure to public officers charged by law with its protection. We are not called upon to approve the wisdom of the
ordinance. We stop when we satisfy ourselves
that it has a
40
reasonable relation to the end to be attained."
As to existing stores of drugs, Judge Cardozo holds otherwise:
"It would be different if only noxious merchandise were
affected. But the ordinance is not so limited. It strikes the good
and the bad alike. The board of health is a subordinate agency
37The quotation marks are used by Judge Cardozo, for example, see supra
note
12 at 375, 152 N. E. at
3
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of local government. Wide powers of regulation it doubtless
has... But the power to regulate is not always equivalent to
the power to destroy... Authority more specific must be found
before a great mass of property, commonly reputed useful, may
be declared contraband altogether, and excluded from the field
of commerce." 4'
It is the due process-police power decision which evokes the
designations "liberal" and "conservative" as applied to judges. If we
use "liberal" to mean tolerant of legislative judgment, kindly disposed
toward the economic and social viewpoints of others, the adjective
fits Judge Cardozo neatly. And if we may redefine "conservatism" to
mean solicitude for the preservation of the essential import of our
constitutional guarantees, he displays that quality as well. We suspect, however, that to some "liberal" means "radical", that to others
"conservative" is synonymous with "reactionary." Judge Cardozo
is neither of these, as his opinions bear witness. But within our
suggested definitions of the labels he is justly entitled to both.
Judge Cardozo's tolerance inevitably leads him to give real meaning to the canon that the wisdom of legislation is a matter for the
legislature to decide. His liberalism will not permit him to confuse a
question of wisdom with one of power. For him "the presumption of
validity which attaches to every act of legislation" is a presumption,
not a mere inference. A presumption it was, to the majority of the
Supreme Court in O'Gorman & Young v. HartfordFire Ins. Co.4 A
majority yet will function. Judge Cardozo says:
"This statute must be obeyed unless it is in conflict with
some command of the constitution, either of the state or of the
nation. It is not enough that it may seem to us to be impolitic
or even oppressive. It is not enough that in its making, great
and historic traditions of generosity have been ignored. We do
not assume to pass judgment upon the wisdom of the legislature.
Our duty is done when we ascertain that it has kept within its
'It must be remembered that legislatures are ultipower. ...
mate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite
as great a degree as the courts.' (Holmes, J. ... ) If doubt
exists whether there is a conflict between the statute and the
These guiding
constitution, the statute must prevail. ...
principles are not to be honored by lip service only. Mischief
and hardship, it is said, will follow the enforcement of this law.
If that is so, we cannot help it. To correct those evils, if they
shall develop, will be the province of legislation. The statute
"Supra note 40 at 282, 12o N. E.at 645.
2282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130 (1931). See Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, Y93o. (1931) 45 HAav. L. REV. 27r,
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does not withhold from the alien the rights secured to him by the

constitution; and we must enforce it as the law." 43
The Constitution itself furnishes no yardstick by which the judge
can measure the constitutionality of a police statute. Certainly the
Due Process Clause sets up no clear standard. The judges have
adopted several adjectives to express their disapproval of the legislative judgment: "unjust", "unreasonable", "arbitrary", "oppressive",
"despotic", to mention some. These adjectives express but do not
control the result which an individual judge has reached. They are
symbols. Remembering this, we are happy in anticipating an addition to the symbolism of the Supreme Court cases:
"But the existence of a power is not refuted by demonstrating
the opportunity for its abuse. The abuse must be dealt with
when it arises... We may not nullify a statute from mere mistrust of the capacity of legislature and people to use their power
wisely. I am persuaded that hundreds of thousands of earnest
men and women believe that justice and equity demand the payment of this bonus. They may be wrong. I do not know. It is
enough that I cannot characterize their belief as a vagary of the
mind, an idle dream or phantasy, an irrational pretense."44
Although the sentences quoted do not come from a due process
opinion, Judge Cardozo apparently will employ the terms: "vagarious", "phantastic", "irrational", to express his due process45 results:
"Again there is significance in practice and decision. If the
Legislatures in so many States have 'deemed it wise to invite
and secure voluntary local co-operation' before applying a plan
'to a given area' .. ., we may suspect that in a choice so general
4
there is something more substantial than a vagary of the will.

1

Reliance on legislative practice in other states to sustain the
legislative judgment of the home state is part and parcel of Judge
Cardozo's liberalism. In a due process case often the debatable
ground consists of a matter of fact. 47 With Mr. Justice Brewer,
Judge Cardozo believes that "a widespread and long-continued belief
concerning it is worthy of consideration :"418
"Enlightening is the course of legislation in States other than
our own. There as here experience has shown that the most
4

3People v. Crane, supranote 33 at 172, 173, io8 N. E. at 433.

"People v. Westchester Co. Nat. Bank, supra note 14 at 491,
251.

132 N. E. at 250,

4And equal protection.
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effective method of attack is by division into units, established,
not merely by coercion,' 49but with the willing co-operation of the
persons most affected.
Cumulative evidence of Judge Cardozo's affirmative tolerance is
found in his use of the separability principle. He will sustain the
valid parts of a partially unconstitutional statute, if "a workable
system would be left,"50 and if he thinks that the legislature would
have desired that the remainder be enforced:
"In this state, we have gone far in subdividing statutes, and
sustaining them so far as valid... The tendency is, I think, a
wholesome one. Severance does not depend upon the separation
of the good from the bad by paragraphs or sentences in the text
The principle of division is not a principle
of the enactment ...
of form. It is a principle of function. The question is in every
case whether the legislature, if partial invalidity had been foreseen, would have wished the statute to be enforced with the invalid part exscinded, or rejected altogether. The answer must be
reached pragmatically, by the exercise of good sense and sound
judgment, by considering how the statutory rule will function if
the knife is laid to the branch instead of at the roots."' 1
And again:
"The statute is not void as a whole though some of its penalties
may be excessive. The good is to be severed from the bad. The
valid penalties remain."52
But there are limits to the application of the principle:
"The defect is so far reaching, it is so deeply wrought into the
substance of the law, that there is no opportunity to sever the
To do that, we should have to rewrite
good from the bad ...
the ordinance. It does not classify or except or excuse... It
touches all who sell. It does not err in some minor incident or in
its effect upon a few. Its fault is inherent in its scheme and extends to many. .. . There can be no severance here that does
not mutilate and destroy.""
VI
No review, however fragmentary, of a judge's constitutional
opinions would be complete without reference to his handling of
precedents. Elsewhere, Judge Cardozo has written at some length
4
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and helpfully on -adherence to precedent. 54 No less helpful are his
opinions, which caution us to differentiate the things done as judge
from the things said as jurist. The former are the decisa of stare
decisis.
"The courts below classified the function as judicial. They
did so believing that two opinions of this court dictated that
conclusion... No doubt there was much said in each of these
opinions to give support to this belief. If we separate, however,
things said from those decided, the question, supposed to be foreclosed, is seen to be open."55
"The case circumscribes the judgment. We hold that the
Legislature acts within its lawful powers when it establishes a
system of licenses for real estate brokers with annual renewals.
Farther than that we do not have to go to decide the controversy
before us.""
"Precedents will be misleading if separated from the statutes
they interpret. Opinions get their color and significance from
the subject of the controversy."57
But what was said and done in older cases is not lightly to be ignored
in the new:
"What was said and assumed in that case has been confirmed
by years of acquiescence too many and too uniform to permit us
to disturb it now upon any nicely balanced arguments." s
Where former decisions have been overruled or superseded by
constitutional amendment, Judge Cardozo, while consigning them to
the limbo of bad law, has a hopeful word to say for their reasoning:
"The earlier cases are no longer authorities, therefore, for
any proposition actually decided. Their reasoning may still
instruct, but can no longer control us. They were decided in
nearly every instance by a bare majority. In at least one instance a majority did not unite in anything more than the result.
It would serve no useful purpose to review the varying opinions
at this time. It is enough to say that they are not decisive of the
case at hand." 59
The phenomena of decision by a bare majority and of agreement by
a majority upon results only have their counterparts in the decisions
of the Court to which Judge Cardozo now belongs. Is it too much to
UCARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) p. I42 et Seg.
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hope that both, but especially the latter, will become rarer with his
accession?
To alter the familiar syllogism beginning "all men are mortal,"
perhaps beyond recognition, by defining mortal to mean fallible, and
by substituting judges for Socrates in the minor premise giving us
"judges are men," 6 produces the conclusion, "judges are mortal."
Which is but to say that judges sometimes err when they decide that
a statute is unconstitutional. The error may not be recognized by
the judge who committed it. Usually it is a successor who is the
discoveror. What is he to do? Suppose that in a past year a majority
of the judges decided that a statute making the transfer in bulk of a
stock of goods fraudulent as against creditors was unconstitutional.
What is the duty of the judge of a later day? Judge Cardozo answers
in no uncertain words:
"This case makes it necessary for us to say whether the socalled sales in bulk law is a constitutional enactment... A very
similar law was enacted in 1904... In Wright v. Hart ([1905]
182 N. Y. 330) we held it to be unconstitutional. We said that it
violated the federal constitution in denying to merchants the
equal protection of the laws. We said that it violated both
federal and state constitution in imposing arbitrary restrictions
upon liberty of contract. That decision was reached by a closely
divided court. Three judges dissented. There were strong dissenting opinions by Judge Vann and Chief Judge Cullen.
"Since Wright v. Hart was decided, the validity of like statutes
has been upheld in two cases by the United States Supreme Court
... Objection to this statute on the ground of conflict with the
federal constitution has thus been removed. We have still to
determine, however, whether there is any conflict with our state
constitution; and that requires us to say whether we shall adhere
to our decision in Wright v. Hart.
"We think it is our duty to hold that the decision in Wright v.
Hart is wrong. The unanimous or all but unanimous voice of the
judges of the land, in federal and state courts alike, has upheld
the constitutionality of these laws. At the time of our decision
in Wright v. Hart, such laws were new and strange. They were
thought in the prevailing opinion to represent the fitful prejudices
of the hour...
The fact is that they have come to stay, and
like laws may be found on the statute books of every state. ....
"In such circumstances we can no longer say, whatever past
views may have been, that the prohibitions of this statute are
arbitrary and purposeless restrictions upon liberty of contract...
The needs of successive generations may make restrictions
imperative to-day which were vain and capricious to the vision
0
No discourtesy to Ohio's Supreme Court Judge Florence E. Allen is intended,
since "men" is used generically. Whether Judge Allen would wish to be excepted
from the syllogism's conclusion, we are unable to say.
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of times past... Back of this legislation, which to a majority
of the judges who decided Wright v. Hart seemed arbitrary and
purposeless, there must have been a real need. We can see this
now, even though it may have been obscure before. Our past
decision ought not to stand in opposition to the uniform convictions of the entire judiciary of the land. Least of all should it
stand when rendered by a closely divided court against the earnest protest of distinguished judges ...
VII

To the virtues attributed to man by the ancients: prudence,
courage, temperance, justice, the theologians added: faith, hope and
charity, the seven cardinal virtues all told. The opinions of Judge
Cardozo which have been reviewed portray qualities the same in
number and similar in kind: vision, firmness, tolerance, humaneness,
candor, tact, felicity of expression.
Clarity of vision, ability to distinguish between form and substance,
between matters that differ only in degree, is an indispensable attribute of the judge. The vision of the realist Judge Cardozo possesses.
His opinions display that "shrewd appreciation of the necessities of
government" ' 2 which he once attributed to others:
"The state ... has given to any laborer employed by a con-

tractor in the construction of a public improvement, a lien for the
value of his labor upon the moneys of the state applicable to that
improvement. The state has thus defined the channels through
which the payment must be made. It has assumed a direct
obligation not only to its own employees, but also to the employees of contractors on its works. To say that the latter class
of employees receive, not the state's moneys, but those of the contractors, is to put form above substance. The great problems of
public law do not turn upon these nice distinctions. The fundamental powers of the state and the fundamental rights of man
are built upon a broader basis. The truth and substance of the
situation is that the contractor's employees are doing the state's
work, and are paid out of the state's moneys; and this truth
ought not to be obscured by distinctions between contractors
and servants established to fix the gradations of civil liability.
"... It is now perceived that all persons engaged on the public works, from the highest officers to the lowest laborers, through
all the gradations of contractors and subcontractors, are, in a
very vital sense, in the service of the state.

.

.

. Whether they

are called officers or employees does not matter. The power of
the legislature depends upon the substance of things, and not
upon names and labels."13
61Ilein v. Maravelas, 219 N. Y. 383, 384, 385, 386, 114 N. E. 8o9, 81o, 81I
62
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And in another case he writes:
"We close our eyes to realities if we do not see in this act the
marks of legislation that is special and local in terms and in effect.
This group of conditions so unusual and particular is precisely
fitted to the claimant's case, and only by a most singular coincidence could be fitted to any other. If we may not say of such a
coincidence that it is literally impossible, at least we may say
that one would be surprising, and several would be marvelous."'
Taking a realist's view, Judge Cardozo sees nothing to fear in the
administrative officer wielding extensive powers:
"The powers devolved by the charter upon the Commissioner
of Accounts are of great importance for the efficient administration of the huge machinery of government in the city of New
York. They will be rendered to a large extent abortive if his
subpoenas are to be quashed in advance of any hearing at the
instance of unwilling witnesses upon forecasts of the testimony
and nicely balanced arguments as to its probable importance.
Very often the bearing of information is not susceptible of intelligent estimate until it is placed in its setting, a tile in the mosaic.
Investigation will be paralyzed if arguments as to materiality or
relevance, however appropriate at the hearing, are to be transferred upon a doubtful showing to the stage of a preliminary
contest as to the obligation of the writ. Prophecy in such circumstances will step into the place that description and analysis
may occupy more safely. Only where the futility of the process
to uncover anything legitimate is inevitable or obvious must
there be a halt upon the threshold."65
Firmness in the face of opposition to his own carefully formed
constitutional views, judge Cardozo displayed in his dissenting
opinion in the Bonus Case:
"We are warned that the recognition of this equity may be
followed by the recognition of others still weaker and more
rarefied. All sorts of hypothetical situations are suggested in
the briefs of counsel, and held before us in terrorem. I am not
swerved by these forebodings. I do not know the equity that
is incapable of being reduced to an absurdity when extended by
some process of analogy to varying conditions. Here, as often
in the law, the difference between right and wrong is a difference
of degree."68
Firmness we have seen him display in upholding the historic immunities from compulsory self-incrimination and unreasonable
searches when their integrity was threatened by the righteous
64Matter of Mayor etc., of New York (Elm St.), supranote 17 at 77,78, 158 N. E.
at 26.
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indignations of the hour. And in the less appealing situation where the
legislature barred alien labor from the public works he refused to
read into the constitution of the state a prohibition, even though the
purpose of the legislation was selfish.
Tolerance, liberality, respect for the opinion of the legislators of his
own and of other states is perhaps the most pronounced characteristic
of Judge Cardozo's opinions. We have referred to it before. We are
content merely to mention it in this catalogue of attributes. It would
prove helpful leaven for any supreme court.
Throughout his opinions we are conscious of the humane spirit
motivating Judge Cardozo. It showed itself in the kindly references
to the police lieutenant's plodding virtues and pedestrian merit, while
denying him special promotion; 7 in the charitable remarks upon
overruled decisions.6 6
An attribute concurrent with clear vision is candor. Particularly
is this quality welcome in the judge. Without overstatement, it can
be styled almost indispensable. Given a candid treatment of the
controlling facts in a case, we may admire the judge's method even
while we disagree with his results. The tendency, however, it to agree
with results which are reached as a result of frankness in the handling
of the facts.
"We cannot say to-day in theface of such overwhelming authority, that the presumption of validity which attaches to every
act of legislation has been overcome. The present statute is
similar in essentials to the one condemned in 1905. In details
it may be distinguished from the earlier one, but the details are
in reality trifling. We cannot without a sacrifice of candor rest
our judgment upon them. We think we ought not to do so. We
should adopt the argument and the conclusion of the dissenting
judges in Wright v. Hart, and affirm the69validity of the statute on
which the plaintiff builds his rights.1
Another instance:
"The prohibition of alien labor in this statute is, however,
unrestricted. It applies to the most temporary and occasional
service, and to the lowest grades of labor. Even in those cases,
it is for the legislature, according to the People's claim, to determine whether some relation exists between efficiency and citizenship; between loyalty in service, and service by the loyal. Such
tests of fitness have a fair relation to permanent positions where
a spirit of allegiance to the employer may be cultivated. It
seems far fetched, however, to apply them to the task of day
laborers excavating for sewers or digging trenches for a subway.
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The relation in such circumstances is so remote that we may consider it illusory." 70
Tact in his conduct which touches upon the domain of the legislator
is not always an outstanding characteristic even of the able judge.
It is unusual to find expressed in judicial opinions approbation of the
legislative course. Yet certainly such expression would make for a
smoother working of the governmental machine. Judge Cardozo
seems spontaneously to be aware of this.
"The Legislature might have said that every farmer in every
township must submit his cattle to the test... It chose to
The safest thing
adopt a rule less general and oppressive. ...
was to leave the choice to the enlightened self-interest of those
within the industry. They would inspect their own herds, not
intermittently and casually, but with the solicitude of ownership. Better than mere officials, they would know what should
be done. "7'
From a judge known to be sympathetic, a tactful plea to the legislature for better draftsmanship in statutes might not go unheeded.
"The task of judicial construction would be easier if statutes
were invariably drafted with unity of plan and precision of expression. Indeed, adherence to the same standards would be
useful also in opinions. The ideal being unattainable, we must not
exaggerate the significance of deviations from the perfect norm." 72
Finally, Judge Cardozo's opinions are marked by an unusual
felicity of expression. The litigant disappointed by his decision could
truthfully have joined in the tribute once paid a distinguished opponent by an attorney who remarked, that even though his opponent's
arguments keenly resembled a stiletto in the hand of the expert, yet
he was happy to say that the pain of the thrust was forgotten in the
pleasure of the association. From this characteristic of grace in the
expression of ideas arises danger of mistaking for agreement with
what the judge has said, approbation of how he has said it. If such
danger there be, it cannot be other than welcome to those whose
lives are spent in reading judicial opinions. That the literature of
the Supreme Court will so soon be enriched by the opinions of Mr.
Justice Cardozo is a thought which cheers. That the body of our law
will draw strength from his "wisdom, uprightness, and learning"to use the words of the Commission-is a conviction which fortifies.t
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tEd. Note: Professor Light plans to write a second article on Mr. Justice
Cardozo for the CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY next year, when he will discuss how
the decisions rendered by the former New York judge conform to the prophecy
herein made.

